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INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that JB, aged 1 8, decides that the time has 
come to open a bank account. She goes to the 
Harbourside Savings Bank on Lambton Quay, and fills in 
the necessary forms giving her name, address, date of 
birth, contact telephone number, and so on. From now 
on, JB is the subject of a computer file at Harbourside 
and the basic information she gave to open the account 
will gradually be supplemented, and occasionally 
altered, according to her changing circumstances. She 
may acquire a full-time job, with her salary paid 
directly into her account, purchase a house with the 
assistance of the bank, start a company with a further 
loan from the bank, or apply for a credit card. Every 
detail of her dealings with the bank will be noted on 
her file . 
None of this, nor indeed any of the rest of this paper, is 
aimed at engendering a "Big Brother Is Watching You" 
mentality. In order to operate successfully, banks must 
necessarily have the information with which to conduct 
accounts and on which to base decisions relating to their 
customers. However, the above example does show that banks 
can and do compile very significant amounts of data, 
financial and otherwise, about their clients. Banks are an 
essential and very sizeable cog in the machinery of the 
modern -state, vital to individuals, to commerce and to the 
economy as a whole. What they do with the information at 
thir disposal can have very far-reaching effects . 
In the past, measures to protect the privacy of customers 
have been strictly limited. Banks have usually given 
priority to their own interests, and the courts have allowed 
them to. In March of this year, however, the seventeen 
members of the New Zealand Bankers' Association adopted a 
new, voluntary, Code of Banking Practice, which contains 
provisions to protect customer information. These provisions 
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are fairly closely modelled on the Privacy of Information 
Bill, which was introduced into Parliament in 1991. The Bill 
1 sets out a number of 'Privacy Principles' against which 
complaints about breaches of privacy are to be assessed by 
the Privacy Commissioner. It applies both to the private and 
the public sectors and seeks to provide much greater 
protection of personal data privacy than individuals have 
had up to now. The Bill has been ref erred back to select 
committee for further submissions, but it looks likely to be 
enacted within the next two or three years. Meanwhile, pre-
empting the proposed legislation, the banks have changed 
their own emphasis considerably towards greater customer 
protection by adopting the basic principles into the Code of 
Practice . 
This paper will examine the provisions in the Code of 
Banking Practice in the context of the general debate on 
privacy, and will assess their effect on previously accepted 
banking practice. It will also seek to assess whether the 
Code is adequate to protect bank customers' privacy, or 
whether legislative intervention in the shape of the 
Privacy of Information Bill is still desirable. 
These are 
Application 
based 
in the 
on the 
OECD 
Principles 
Guidelines 
for National 
Concerning the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data (1980), and the Council of Europe's "Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data 11 (1981). 
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I THE PRIVACY DEBATE 
The first question to be asked is why the law should protect 
an individual's privacy at all. Tim McBride's paper on data 
privacy cites an argument that our interpersonal 
relationships are essentially based on respect for each 
2 
others' privacy. Perhaps for this reason, it has been 
accepted as a fundamental human right in Article 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, in Article 17 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1966 and, in the limited form of a right not to be subjected 
to unreasonable search and seizure, in section 21 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, among others. 
However, the common law courts, with some exceptions in the 
United States, have been very reluctant to extend the 
present common law to protect a person's privacy per se. If 
a complaint cannot be brought under the mantle of such areas 
as defamation, trespass or breach of 
complainant probably has no 
certain limited circumstances 
for breach of confidence 
remedy at 
be possible 
under the 
jurisdiction. Despite the considerable 
contract, then the 
3 law. It may in 
to bring an action 
court's equitable 
expansion of this 
field in recent years, however, it cannot be regarded as 
generally available for breaches of privacy.
4 
The reluctance of the courts is in many ways readily 
understandable. The general area of privacy is extremely 
wide and vague, damage is difficult to quantify in many 
2 T. McBride Data Privacy : An Options Paper (Department of 
Justice, Wellington, 1987),13 . 
3 The closest that New Zealand courts appear to have come 
to accepting the limited protection of the tort of 
'public disclosure of private facts' is in Tucker v News 
Media Ownershio Ltd D986] 2 NZLR, 735 per McGechan J. 
4 McBride, as above note 2, 54-59. 
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cases, and an individual's "right to privacy" frequently 
clashes irreconcilably with other fundamental rights such as 
freedom of speech. Applying demarcation lines so as to allow 
some forms or degrees of breach of privacy to be actionable 
and not others is in many cases practically impossible. In 
1975, Palmer pointed out the futility of questing after a 
general law on privacy, and recommended that specific 
measures be taken in areas where a need is clearly 
demonstrated.
5 
One of these areas is data privacy, a relatively small, 
though growingly important subset of the general field. Many 
jurisdictions throughout the world have enacted legislation 
to protect data subjects, among them the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Canada and Australia. 
6 In fact, New Zealand 
is a noticeable exception to the general trend of enacting 
privacy legislation. 
Data privacy can be defined as the interest of the 
individual in controlling the circulation of information 
personal to him or her which is held by others. 
7 Personal 
information is information held about an identifiable 
8 · fd . 1 1 b person. Protection o ata privacy can c ear y not e 
absolute, however, but must be balanced against competing 
bl . d . . 9 pu ic an private interests: 
A balance must be found between the interests of the 
individual and the interests of society, 
the efficient conduct of industry, 
administration . 
which include 
commerce and 
So, a 
with 
requirement 
regard to 
that banks should maintain total secrecy 
their customers' accounts would be 
5 G. Palmer "Privacy and the Law", (1975) NZLJ, 747-748. 
6 Data Protection Act 1984 (UK), Privacy Act 1974 (USA), 
Privacy Act 1982 (Canada) and Privacy Act 1988 (Aust). 
7 McBride, as above note 2, 14. 
8 Official Information Act 1982, s.2. 
9 Report of the Cornmi ttee on Data Protection ( 19 7 8, Cmnd 
7 3 4 1 ) par a 2 • 0 9 • 
Ill 
• 
Ill 
• • 
5 
unreasonable. The public interest in detecting crime, for 
example, entitles agencies such as the Serious Fraud Office 
to obtain access to customer records. Also, it would unduly 
restrict a bank's ability to function efficiently if it were 
unable to protect itself by producing customer information 
in litigation against that customer. 
The growth in information technology, especially over the 
last decade, is the main reason for the rise 1.n public 
concern about data privacy. Info-technology has now advanced 
to the point where it is possible to build very detailed 
profiles of data subjects using separate items of 
information from various sources. All customer transactions 
with a bank, for example, must be recorded and stored for 
seven years before destruction.
10 Add to this various items 
of publicly available information, and the network 
facilities available to banks enable them, or agencies which 
have access to their records, to compile a reasonably 
accurate picture of a person's life. This is not to say that 
such profile-building takes place regularly, but where the 
technologica 1 capability exists, so does the potential for 
abuse. The threat of 'hackers' gaining access to data 
storage systems, and the huge increase in transborder flows 
1 1 
of personal data compound the problem further. 
Various international bodies are involved in attempts to 
regulate the area of data privacy, among them the Council of 
Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. The latter, for instance, produced its 
"Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy" 
1 2 in 198 0 as a 
response to the growing public concern. Its main aim was to 
facilitate harmonisation of member countries' data privacy 
10 Section 12, Banking Act 1982. 
11 Thus the main threat to data privacy comes from 
automated data systems. It may be argued that the 
Privacy of Information Bill's coverage of manual as well 
as automated systems is overkill, but this is not 
examined in this paper. 
12 As above, note 1. 
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laws. To achieve this, the Guidelines set out "Basic 
Principles of National Application". 13 This is a statement 
of what the drafters 14 considered to be minimum standards 
of data privacy to which member states should adhere. 
1 5 
Compliance with the principles by signatories should ensure 
both that the individual's right to data privacy is 
adequately protected and that the free flow of data between 
those signatories is enhanced, since equal protection of the 
information in the recipient country is guaranteed. New 
Zealand adopted the Guidelines on 23 September 1980, 
together with fifteen other member states. 
The Guidelines are merely recommendatory in nature, and do 
not bind their signatories in international law. It was, 
however, envisaged that "[t] he Guidelines could serve as a 
starting point for the development of an international 
Convention when the need arises". 16 In the mean time, the 
Council of the OECD recommended that "Member countries take 
into account in their domestic legislation the principles 
.•. set forth in the Guidelines 11 • 17 
A summary of the privacy principles is as follows: 
Collection 
Information should not be collected unnecessarily, and 
is to be obtained by lawful and fair means ( ie. not 
obtained by coercion or deception). If financial or 
other pressures effectively mean consent to give 
information is compulsory (as with applying for a bank 
loan) the donee may be under a stricter obligation to 
observe the other protective measures. 18 
1 3 Part Two, paras 7-14. 
14 An Exoert Group, under the chairmanshio 
Honourable Mr Justice Kirby of Australia. 
15 Part One, para.6. 
16 Explanatory Memorandum, page 24. 
17 Recommendation of the Council, clause 1. 
18 McBride, as note 2, 16. 
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The information should be relevant to the purposes for 
which it is collected, and should be as accurate, 
complete and up-to-date as is reasonable. 
Storaqe 
"Personal data should be protected by reasonable 
security safeguards against such risks as loss or 
unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or 
disclosure of data. 1119 
Use and disclosure 
An agency must not disclose, make available or use 
personal information for a purpose other than that for 
which it was obtained. Exceptions to this are limited, 
but include where the purpose for which the information 
is disclosed is directly related to the purpose for 
which it was obtained, or the disclosure is authorised 
by law. 
Access 
Individuals should have the right to be told by the 
agency whether data relating to them is or is not held 
by that agency. They should have access to the data 
within a reasonable time, at a charge, if any, which is 
not excessive. The information should be given in a 
form which they can easily understand . 
If such a request is denied, the data subject should 
have the right to reasons for the denial, and the right 
to challenge the denial. If the information is 
inaccurate, incomplete or out-of-date, then the 
individual to whom it related should have the right to 
have it rectified or erased. 
The Guidelines are one of the main motivating forces behind 
the New Zealand Government's introduction of the Privacy of 
Information Bill into Parliament. The principles set out in 
the Bill accord closely with the 'minimum standards' of the 
Guidelines. Originally, the Bill also contained provisions 
to allow information-matching programmes to combat welfare-
19 OECD Guidelines, as note 1, Part Two, para.11. 
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fraud.
2° For reasons of political expediency, given the even 
more contentious nature of the rest of the Bill, the 
Government decided to enact these provisions separately. The 
Privacy Commissioner's Act 1991 thus establishes the office 
of Privacy Commissioner as general overseer of privacy 
. d f . f . h' 21 issues an as approver o in ormation-matc ing programmes. 
The main body of the Bill, however, remains before select 
committee. It contains the fourteen privacy principles, 
provisions dealing with good reasons for refusing access to 
personal information, and provisions for exemptions from the 
principles. It also gives details of the complaints 
procedure to be followed, and amends various other Acts such 
as the Official Information Act. The legislation is still 
far from trouble-free, but it is the writer's view that its 
unifying theme of data privacy protection makes it an 
improvement on the original. 
One of the most contentious aspects of the Bil 1 is its 
application to the private as well as the public sector. 
Agencies such as banks, which hold a great deal of personal 
information, are therefore one of its principal targets. The 
private sector has produced some highly vocal opponents of 
h ·11 h h . k · · · 
22 
t e Bi , among t em t e Direct Mar . eting Association. It 
claims that the "draconian" provisions of the proposed 
legislation will have a disastrous effect on the access to 
databases which is at the heart of the direct marketing 
business. 
achieve 
interests 
The 
the 
and 
principles in the 
correct balance 
the interests of 
Bill, it argues, 00 not 
between the individual's 
23 
commerce. The Newspaper 
20 One of the first programmes to be reported is that 
between Customs and Social Welfare, The Dominion, 
Wellington, 21 July 1992. 
21 The Privacy Commissioner cannot therefore as yet receive 
complaints about breaches of data privacy. 
22 Others includ e various charitable organisations and arts 
groups. 
23 Memorandum to the Minister of Justice from the 
Department of Justi c e, 28 June 1991, annex. 
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Publishers' Association criticises the Bill as impinging 
too much on the freedom of the press to use and collect 
personal information. It also claims that the Bill takes 
"no account of the day-to-day running of a media 
organisation 11 •
24 However, the writer contends that there 
are strong arguments in favour of the inclusion of the 
private sector in the legislation. 
Firstly, the information about which people are most 
sensitive relates to income, assets and credit, which is 
information most commonly held by private sector 
organisations. 
2 5 The Annual Report of the (Australian) 
Privacy Commissioner in 1989 said:
26 
Many argue that there is more to be found by way of 
privacy invasion in the private sector. The argument 
runs that governments are publicly accountable for 
their actions and subject to 
Parliament and their employees a re 
sanction for breaches of discipline 
the oversight of 
subject to severe 
or confidentiality 
These constraints do not apply in the private 
sector. Yet the private sector organisation often has 
incentives (profit) and resources to acquire new 
technology which far outstrip those of government. 
Over ninety percent of 
some form of database. 
businesses in New Zealand now have 
27 It therefore seems in many ways 
illogical to enact privacy legislation covering only the 
public sector, especially considering the protection already 
afforded by the Official Information Act. 
24 Letters, The Listener, 6 April 1992. 
25 Speech by The Hon. Douglas Graham, Mi nister of Justice, 
to the Criminal Bar Association AGM , 27 September 1991. 
26 First Annual Report of the Privacy Commissioner, 
January 19 89 to 30 June 1989, page 45. This confidence 
in the public service may seem rather misplaced , 
however, in the light of revelations about the sale of 
personnl information in qovernment cornouters in 
Aust r a 1 i a , The Dorn i n ion , \ ,7 e 11 in CJ ton 1 4 i'.\ u CJ us t 1 9 9 2 , 5 . 
27 As a~ove, note 23 . 
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Secondly, the OECD Guidelines apply both to the private 
and the public sectors. New Zealand should therefore follow 
that approach in implementing the Guidelines in domestic 
legislation. So far, twenty three out of twenty seven 
states with data privacy legislation cover both sectors. 
28 
It has been suggested that countries without adequate 
legislative provisions may be unable to participate to the 
full in the international information market. Application to 
the private sector is therefore essential if this threat is 
to be eliminated. 
Thirdly, in other areas of law, for example administrative 
law, there has been a general blurring of the public/private 
distinction. It has been recognised that what matters more 
than the nature of the body is to what extent the actions of 
an agency have oublic effect. This is especially important 
as changes are made to the bureaucratic structure with 
formerly publicly-control led assets being transferred into 
private hands through corporatisation and privatisation. The 
writer suggests that, in the same way, the emphasis in 
privacy law should not be on whether an agency is private or 
public sector. Rather, we should concentrate on the effect 
that data-collecting agencies of all kinds have on their 
data-subjects. Agencies such as banks, insurance companies 
and credit reference agencies have enormous public effect. 
Data subjects need adequate protection regard less of which 
agency holds the information. 
The Government has recently 
will to tackle the privacy 
therefore seems likely that 
privacy principles, will be 
indicated that the political 
is sue i s a 1 iv e and we l l . I t 
the Bill, with its core of 
passed within the next few 
years. Meanwhile, organisations such as the banks have 
turned their minds to self-regulation. This may be partly an 
effort to postpone more stringent leg is la ti ve intervention 
for as long as possible; there is certainly a good deal of 
mileage to be gained from oroducing an effective self-
28 Department of Justice, "The Information Privacy Bill -
Application to the Private Sector", 28 March 1991. 
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policing scheme. Also, such organisations are very well 
aware of the increased public awareness of privacy issues, 
29 and those with effective protective mechanisms may gain a 
competitive advantage in a tight market. This therefore, is 
the genesis of the new Code of Banking Practice, with its 
provisions for greater protection of customer information . 
29 Elisabeth Lon gworth "Final Word", The Dominion, 
Wellington, ~arch 30 1992, 20. 
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II THE PRESENT LEGAL POSITION 
With the exception of some statutory provisions, which have 
no bearing on the privacy issue, the relationship between 
banks and their customers has hitherto been defined and 
governed by the common law. The only asoect of the 
relationship, as dealt with by the courts, which protects 
customer data privacy is the bank's duty of confidentiality. 
This is the duty not to disclose information relating to the 
customer which the bank obtains in the course of hand ling 
the customer's 
principles of 
account. Thus, 
data privacy, 
the 
such as 
other fundamental 
access and use 
limitation, have up to now had no place in banking law. 
The Banker's Duty of Confidentiality 
The law on the topic of disclosure is of fairly mo dern 
origin in banking terms. The leading case in the fiel d is 
Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of Englana , 30 
and it is recognised and applied equally in New Zealand. 31 
Prior to this, it was uncertain whether the bank's d uty of 
confidentiality 
if it was a 
was a legal, or merely a moral d uty. Also, 
legal duty, it was unclear under what 
circumstances, if any, it might still be "reasonable an d 
32 proper" to communicate information to a third party. Tl-i e 
Court of Appeal in Tournier, however, unan i mously de c ided 
that the duty of the bank to keep its customers' affairs 
secret is a "legal one arising out of contract" 33 The scooe 
of the duty was indicated by At k in LJ: 34 
30 
3 1 
32 
33 
34 
It clearl y goe s beyond the state of the ac c ount, that 
is, whe ther the re is a debit or a credit balance, an d 
the amount of the balance. It must exte nd at l east t o 
all th e transactions that go through the ac c ount, and 
~ g2 3] 1 KB 4 6 1 . 
See for example M. Russell Introduction to New Ze aland 
Banking Law, 5 8 ; Ty ree New Ze alancl Banking La w, 8 4. 
Hard y V Ve as e y L. R. 3 Ex . 1 0 7 . 
Tourni e r, as note 30, per Bank e s LJ at 472. 
Tourn ier, a s no te 30, at 4 8 5. 
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to the securities, if any, given in respect of the 
account; and in respect of such matters it must, I 
think, extend beyond the period when the account closed 
or ceases to be an active account I further think 
that the obligation extends to information obtained 
from other sources than the customer's actual account, 
if the occasion upon which the information was obtained 
arose out of the banking relations of the bank and its 
customer ... 
The duty is, necessarily, not absolute, but qualified, and 
the accepted qualifications to it are those set out by 
Bankes LJ at page 473: 
a) where disclosure is under compulsion by law; 
b) where there is a duty to the public to disclose; 
c) where the interests of the bank require disclosure; 
d) where the disclosure is made by the express or 
implied consent of the customer. 
a) Compulsion by law . 
A growing number of statutes in New Zealand allow access to 
customer records by such agencies as the Inland Revenue 
and the Serious Fraud Office. 35
 It is clear that banks must 
comply with the requirements of statute. 
This exception also covers court orders, such as orders for 
discovery when a bank is a party to proceedings. 
b) Duty to the public 
This duty covers disclosures made in exceptional 
circumstances, for example to prevent death or injury to 
another, or in matters of national security or orevention of 
serious crime. These types of situations, however, are 
almost completely covered by statutory compulsion to 
35 ,l:\11 statutes allowing access to customer records are 
listed in the Annex ( I I ) to the Coae of Banking 
Practice. ~any thousands of inquiries are made each year. 
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36 disclose, so this exception may be largely unnecessary. 
c) The interests of the bank 
The interests of the bank may clearly override 
confidentiality when a bank engages in litigation with a 
customer or with a guarantor. However, only information 
which is strictly relevant to the proceedings should be 
used.
37 
The two main areas of uncertainty are disclosures made 
within the banking group and disclosures to credit reference 
agencies. Banks may feel entitled to release information 
without customer consent to other companies within their 
banking group, 
subsidiaries. This 
some 
is of 
of which may 
growing concern 
be non-banking 
in New Zealand, as 
banking groups expand, and most customers are una~vare of the 
identities of the various members of the groups. 
k f T k L a K 38 l0 t . d Ban o o yo t v aroon, was sai 
However, in 
that each 
corporate entity within the banking group must be viewed as 
a separate entity for confidentiality purposes. Consent ~ay 
therefore be required for disclosure. It is arguable, 
though, that passing information to such of the subsidiaries 
as are banks is cost-effective and acceptable, provic1 ed it 
is for a strictly defined purpose. Consent should be 
obtained prior to disclosure to non-banking subsidiaries. 39 
Credit reference agencies collect information on the 
creditworthiness of a person from public sources and from 
providers of credit who are willing to release information. 
36 But see Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Ba nkers Trust Co 
Q 988] 1 LLR 259, where a higher duty to the public was 
tentatively accepted though other exceotions did not 
apply. R Grandison, in F. Neate , R. McCormick (eds ) Ba nk 
Confidentiality (Butterworths, London, 1990 ),96. 
37 As above, note 36, at 95. 
38 [1987J AC 45. 
39 Banki na Services : Law and Practice . Report by the Review 
Committee (The Jack Report)(UK, December 19 88 ). 
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They then sell the information to potential lenders. It 
appears that in the United Kingdom at least, banks have 
until recently made use of this information but have not 
themselves contributed. There is, however, a clear trend 
towards banks making more information available to such 
agencies, although this is not clearly covered by any of the 
Tournier exceptions. 
d) Consent. 
Clearly no problem arises if a customer expressly consents 
to the disclosure of information. However, implied consent 
is a contentious subject. Most bank customers are quite 
unaware of many of the terms of their contract with the 
bank, and so implying consent to disclosure under certain 
circumstances is fraught with difficulties. For example, it 
was supposedly an implied term that bankers' references 
could be given to third parties, yet few customers would 
have been aware that such practices existed. 40 
Another potential problem in this area is the recent 
development in the United States 
directives. These are documents 
of issuing 
which a 
consent 
customer 
authorises a bank to release information about himself or 
herself to government authorities. The customer has been 
compelled to sign the documents by court order, under threat 
of fines or imprisonment. The status of such directives is 
uncertain, for it is fundamental that consent must be freely 
given. A bank's refusal to disclose information under a 
consent directive may mean 
an action for contempt of 
that the customer 
4 1 court, however. 
is exposed to 
Such practices 
are as yet unknown in New Zealand, but conflicts will arise 
with the duty of confidentiality and with any privacy 
legislation if they are introduced here. 
40 1n ora,:;+:1-C""', bnn1<ars c r2~.,,.r~ns"'!~ l-iave not been <Jiven 
witl-iou~ son~en~ h 0 ~~ for s~~a ~ime. ~onsent is now 
r~auirea by +:he Co~e of R~n~~nn Pr~ctire, para. 10.4.2. 
4 1 Bank Confi dentiality , as note 36, at 91-92. 
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Therefore, although on the face of it Tournier's case 
appears to provide fairly thorough protection for the bank 
customer, the above discussion illustrates some of the areas 
of difficulty and uncertainty, which seriously undermine the 
protection afforded. 
The Code of Banking Practice 
The new Code of Banking Practice was introduced on 1 ~arch 
1992. It aims to rectify some of the difficulties inherent 
in banking law, where bank/customer relations are based on a 
contract with mainly implied terms. This is done by setting 
out minimum standards of good banking practice, thus making 
the terms of the contract more "transoarent". At the same 
time, competition should be stimulated by making it easier 
for consumers to compare services offered by the banks. The 
Code is a voluntary, industry-produced document, and 
customers will still make indi vidua 1 contracts with their 
banks. However, the Code should, it is suggested, be treated 
by the banks as if it were legally binding on them . 
There are several reasons for this. Firstly:
42 
it is impossible to say that the Code raises or sets 
minimum standards of fair dealing unless banks are 
committed to honouring it. And to the extent that the 
Code seeks to stifle any inchoate urge on the oart of 
the Government to legislate, no bank will try to 
persuade a Court that non-compliance can be excused 
because the Code is legally meaningless. 
Secondly, if comparison between the banks is facilitated by 
better informing the consumer as to minimum standards of 
practice, it would not make sense commercially to fall below 
those standarrls. 
42 F. r-1iller "Code of Banking Practice - ~vhat Will It '-1ean 
For Banks?" (unpublished !_)aner c'lelivered to Jew Zealand 
Bankers' Association conference, 1991) at 9age 2. 
• • 
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Thirdly, evidence of current practice, as well as precedent, 
are used by the courts to determine what the terms of the 
relationship between bank and customer are. The Code is now 
the primary evidence of this current banking practice. It 
may also be evidence of customers' reasonable expectations 
which, if relied upon to the detriment of the customer, may 
result in the bank being estopped from contravening its 
. . 43 provisions. 
Lastly, but very significantly, is the voluntary creation by 
the banking industry of the Banking Ombudsman scheme, which 
came into effect on July 1992. The Banking Ombudsman's 
task is to resolve, in a non-adversarial manner, disputes 
which remain deadlocked after the bank's own internal 
complaints procedure has been exhausted. Bank customers do 
not have to pay for this service, as the scheme is fully 
funded by the participating banks. The complete independence 
of the Banking Ombudsman is, moreover, assured by the 
placing of the Banking Ombudsman Commission between the 
Ombudsman and the participating banks. The Commission 
comprises a neutral Chairman, two members from the banks, 
one person nominated by the Minister of Consumer Affairs, 
and the Executive Director of the Consumers' Institute or 
other customer representative. 
The first Banking Ombudsman, appointed for an initial oeriod 
of two years, is Mrs Nadja Tollemache. Her reputation, built 
up over the past five years as an Ombudsman reporting to 
Parliament, is likely to inspire confidence in and respect 
for the scheme on the part of banks and customers alike. 
The Banking Ombudsman is likely to hold the banks strictly 
to the letter of the Code in resolving disputes, s i nee she 
will treat the provisions as implied terms of the contract. 
The formal sanctions available to the Ombudsman are few; the 
role is mainly a recommendatory one. However, if a 
43 ~iller, as not e 42, p~ge 3. 
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recommendation is accepted by the complainant but not by the 
bank within one month of being made, the Ombudsman may make 
a binding award against the bank. 4 4 The award shal 1 not 
exceed $100,000 and shall only be sufficient to compensate 
the customer for direct loss or damage suffered by reason of 
the acts or omissions of the bank. 45 Awards will probably be 
rare ; the British Banking Ombudsman (a similar non-statutory 
scheme) reported that so far no bank has refused to accept 
any formal recommendation made by the Banking Ombudsman. 46 
All this has considerable importance for customer data 
privacy. The Code does more than set out formerly accepted 
standards of banking practice. It also significantly alters 
the status quo in some respects, particularly, from the 
point of view of this paper, the inclusion of provisions for 
h . f . f . 47 t_ e protection o customer in ormatLon. 
A summary of the Code's provisions shows that the banks have 
modelled their approach fairly closely on the privacy 
principles as given in the Privacy of Information Bill: 48 
Personal information is to be collected for the 
purposes of establishing and maintaining relationships 
with customers. 
Customer consent is required before information is used 
for purposes other than that for which it was collected 
"or related purposes". 
Banks are to take all reasonable steps to ensure that 
information is accurate, complete and UP-to-date. 
Disclosure is only allowed in situations covereo by 
the Tournier oualifications. 
44 The banks are deemed to have undertaken to be bound by 
Rn awarrl under the Rules of the Banking Ombuds~an 
Commission, para. 16.3. 
45 Terms of Reference for the Banking Ombudsman,para 14 
4S Seventh Report of the U~ Bankinq Ombudsman. 
47 Code of Banking Pr~ctice, oara. 10. 
48 See Appendix A. 
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Third parties to whom disclosures are made may be asked 
to treat the information as confidential. 
Customers are to have access to their personal 
information. This will include address, occupation, 
marital status, age, sex, accounts held, their balances 
and statements. Access is to be given within a reasonab\e. 
time. Banks may recover the costs of supplying the 
information. 
The customer has the right to reasons for denial of 
access to personal information and to challenge the 
denial through internal complaints procedures. 
He or she also has the right to require correction of 
records, which must be amended accordin0ly. Tf 
incorrect information has been released to third 
parties, banks are to take all reasonable steps to 
inform those parties of the necessary corrections. 
A close examination of the provisions reveals that the scooe 
of some of them is rather unclear and that improvements 
could be made. First, it should be made clear that 
information will only be used for the purposes for which it 
was collected or for directly related pur~oses. The wor~ing 
of the Code at present may allow use for indirectly related 
purposes. Another ambiguity is the use of 'consent' without 
stating whether express, or merely implied consent is 
reouired.The reference to the Tournier consent aualification 
certainly includes im9lied consent. However, implied consent 
may be inappropriate when dealing with use of customer 
information or the giving of bankers' references, and causes 
problems with disclosure itself.
49 tluch of the docume ntation 
used by the banks contains references to collecting 
information from, or releasing it to, third parties. It is 
suggested that in order for exl) ress consent to be qiven by 
49 See above, Part II. 
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the customer, it may be necessary for the bank to point out 
the fine print specifically and receive authorisation. 
Secondly, the Code provides that the customer has a right of 
access to his or her personal information. However, the list 
of information available, while not exhaustive, would 
seem only to give the customer the chance to check that th€se 
non-controversial data are correct. Information such as 
assessments of creditworthiness contained, for example, in 
diary notes may not be accessible, al though inaccur3.cy in 
this respect would be far more damaging to the customer than 
in H"\O$€ cat-e90,(cs 
~A. listed. It 
circumstances in 
is clearly envisaged that there 
which the bank will wish to deny 
may be 
access, 
but possible good reasons for denial are not soecified. This 
neither aids the customer, nor gives a basis for a decision 
under the internal co~plaints procedure or before the 
Banking Ombudsman . 
These shortcomings, however, 
merit of the provisions, 
by no means destroy 
which give the 
the basic 
customer 
significantly improved privacy orotection. The banks have 
voluntarily taken an important first step towarrls 
comprehensive data protection. In some cases , the 
obligations undertaken to the customer are fairly onerous.
50 
The action of the banks is to be aoplaudeo. 
50 For example, the obligation to take all reasonable steps 
to keep records accurate, complete and up-to-date. The 
onus is thus shifted from the customer , who rreviously 
had to notify the banks of changes , to the ban~ itself. 
Ohat 'reasonable steps ' will entail is of course an ooen 
auestion . 
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III THE NEED FOR DATA PRIVACY LEGISLATION 
The opening statement of paragraph 10 of the Cone of Bankin~ 
Practice declare s firmly: 
The following provisions relatinq to the protection of 
customer information have been drafted prior to the 
coming into effect of any privacy of information 
legislation and will be reviewed on the en:tctment of 
any such leq is la tion to ensure that they con f or!ll with 
the provisions of that legislation. 
This seems to recognise the probability of an eventual 
enactment of the Privacy of Information Bill , while also 
demonstrating the gooawill of the industry. Inherent in it 
too, perhaps, is a certain amount of confidence that little 
would need to be changed in the event of the Bill becoming 
law, since the Code's provisions are clearly modelled on t~e 
privacy principles at the heart of the Bill. It is 
suggested , however, 
between the Code anc'l 
that there 
the Bill. 
are 
In 
significant differences 
some respects, the Bill 
woula provide greater protect ion than the Cone . However , it 
cannot be ignored that there are flaws in the dra f tina of 
the Bill which seriously undermine the protection affor~ed . 
Nevertheless , the writer firmly believes that leg is la ti ve 
intervention is not only desirable but vital in torl~y's data 
controlled society. 
The disanvantages of the Code when compared with the Bill 
First , there is no provision in the Coae of Bankinq Practice 
that personal information must generally be collected 
directly from the individual concernen . Banks are therefore 
free to collect information about their customers from Any 
outside source. This is frequently useful in supplementine; 
information already held by the bank . Crerlit reference 
agencies , for example , are among the princioal outside 
sources of information to which banks qain access . Principle 
2 of the 8ill , however , would limit a bank ' s ability to 
collect oersonal information from third oarties '1lainly to 
Ill 
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situations where 
a) the information is already publicly available; 
b) the customer authorises the collection; 
c) collecting data directly from the customer would 
prejudice the purposes of the collection.
51 
It is submitted that it would not be unreasonable to require 
that customers authorise the collection of data fro~ outside 
sources. Any data which the banK considers to be very high1y 
sensitive are likely to fall within exception c). Perhaos 1n 
the majority of cases, consent will effectively have to be 
given in order to obtain a rlesired service. For exam!_)le, a 
bank may wish to obtain information from a credit reference 
agency before granting a loan facility. If the customer 
52 authorises this, then she or he is at least aware 
thereafter of the existence of that information in the ban~ 
file. If a decision is taken which is unf;;ivourable to the 
customer, she or he may then request access to the 
information to check its accuracy and if necessary require 
correction of errors. 
Secondly, there are no real provisions in the Code for the 
safe storage of customer data. Paragraph 10. 1 st3tes that 
"strict internal rules on the use, avai lal:>ility and access 
to information held on custo!'Tlers" will be im!_)osed by ban1<s. 
This falls short of Principle 5 in the Bill, which requires 
that "inf orrna tion is protected by such security sa f eguarrfa 
as it is reasonable in the circumstances to take against: 
(i) Loss; and 
(ii) unauthorisea 
disclosure; and 
access, use, moc'lification or 
51 The writer's criticism of the exclusion of publicly 
available information from the protection of the Ri 11 is 
noted below. 
52 See above, Part TI. For this to 'r:Je effective, th':' l:)ank 
should soecifically Doint out the relevant clause 0f the 
rlocu!'Tlentation and gain exoress consent. 
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(iii) other misuse. 
In 9ractice, most banks are 
and such a duty might seem 
extremely security-conscious, 
to be superfluous. However, 
mistakes occur, 
desks in such 
information on 
such as angling VDU screens on 
a way that other customers can 
them. Adhering to the requirements 
tellers' 
see the 
of safe 
storage should not be too onerous for the banks. Also, if it 
can be shown that divulgence of or interference with 
personal data was caused by lax security standards, a remedy 
should be available to the customer which the Code may not 
provide. 
Thirdly, the Code, as mentioned above, is not specific 3S to 
what reasons might allow a bank to deny a customer's request 
for access to personal information. Acceptable reasons for 
denying access under the Bill are stated in Parts IV and V. 
These have been taken from the Off ic ia l In f orrna tion Act, 
where they have not proved to be unduly restrictive for the 
person requesting information. The reasons in the Bi 11 for 
denial of access include, in clause 27 (1)(b) situations 
where making the information available "would be likely 
unreasonably to prejudice 
person who supplied 
the commercial position of the 
the information". This may be 
overridden by considerations of public interest, however. 
Banks and customers would therefore both be adequately 
protected under the legislation. As it stands, however, the 
scope of what the banks might term "good reasons" for 
denying access under the Code may be just as wide or as 
narrow as the banks themselves wish. It is aifficult to see 
the provisions of the Code as giving sufficient certainty of 
access for the 'right' to have much meaning. The legislation 
would give that certainty. 
Lastly, there is a wider range of remedies a vai lab le to a 
natural person whose privacy is breached under the Bill. The 
Human Rights Tribunal will have power to make leg~lly 
binding decisions about complaints, and may 
declarations or orders as soecified in clause 73: 
l r .. w Llt'.:ll, qy 
- ---.- , , , , !' ,~r:t ... ,1T·( u, 
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a) A declaration that the action of the defendant is an 
interference with the privacy of an individual; 
b) An order restraining the defendant from continuing 
or repeating the interference, or from engaging in, 
or causing or permitting otheis to engage in, 
conduct of the same kind as that constituting the 
interference ... 
c) Damages in accordance with clause 76 of the Act; 
d) An order that the defendant perform any acts 
specified in 
interference 
the order with a 
or redressing 
view 
any 
to remedying the 
loss or damage 
suffered by the aggrieved individual as a result of 
the interference, or both. 
The Tribunal may make an award of damages in accordance with 
clause 76 in respect of one or more of: 
a) Pecuniary loss suffered as a result of, and expenses 
reasonably incurred by the individual for the 
purpose of the transaction or activity out of which 
the interference arose; 
b) Loss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary 
kind, which the aggrieved individual rnight 
reasonably be expected to obtain but for the 
interference; 
c) Humiliation, loss of dignity, and injury to the 
feelings of the aggrieved individual. 
The Banking Ombudsman, in contrast, rnay rnake a binding awar~ 
only in respect of direct pecuniary loss. If such loss 
cannot be shown, anr1 the bank refuses to acceot a 
recommendation on recompense, the customer is left without a 
remedy. It is worth noting that the limit of damaqes in the 
legislation is rnuch lower than that available from the 
53 Banking Ombudsman, but the latter can a0judicate disoutes 
53 The limit of an award by the Ornbur'lsrnan is $100,000; the 
Tribunal may award only up to $50,000 under cl. 76(2). 
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between companies as well as natural persons. The maximum in 
the Bill, however, relates to the most any one individual 
(natural person) can receive. Also, privacy issues are 
likely to form only a very small percentage of the 
complaints to the Banking Ombudsman and are less likely to 
involve very large sums of money than many other heads of 
claim. The introduction of the legislation would therefore 
greatly enhance the remedies open to an individual customer, 
who may not be able to show direct pecuniary loss, but who 
may have missed out on a job, a loan or a house sale, or 
have suffered severe humiliation as a result of a breach of 
privacy . 
The shortcomings of the Bill 
Despite the above remarks, however, it is recognised tl--iat 
the Bill is in some respects significantly flawed. If 
various deficiencies are not corrected before the Bill is 
enacted, it may well be that a \:)ank customer whose privacy 
is breached by their bank would fare better in complaining 
to the Banking Ombudsman under the Code than to the Privacy 
Commissioner. 
Tl-ie first concern is that showing that a breach of the 
privacy principles has occurred does not in itself ensure 
that the aggrieved person will be entitled to a remedy. The 
complainant must also show, under clause 59, that, for 
example, the action interfering with privacy is contrary to 
law, or unreasonable, 
incH v idua 1 may bring an 
herself if the Privacy 
unjust or oppressive. 
action to the Tribunal himself or 
54 Commissioner declines to do so, 
that person may have to bear th9 cost of oroceedin0s under 
clause 73(2). 55 A breach of the orovisions of tl-ie Core, 
54 Privacy of Information Bill 1991, c] .71. 
55 Report of the Chief Ombudsman and the Omhudsman to the 
Justice and Law Reform Committee on tl--ie Privacy of 
Information Bill, December 1991, 15. 
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however, will be viewed as a breach of the terms of the 
contract between bank and customer by the Banking Ombudsman. 
The complainant has less to prove, and the claim can be 
dealt with directly. The customer also does not have to 
shoulder any of the costs of the proceedings. 
The second major concern, which affects the operation of the 
whole Bill, is its exclusion of "publicly available 
information" from the protection of the princioles. 56 This 
57 was heavily criticised in the Ombudsmen's Report. 
Examples of 
name, place 
publicly available information 
and date of birth, parentage, 
include 
marital 
status, children, address, occupation as well as 
particulars relating to the ownershio of land, motor 
vehicles, secured debts, crirninal records, 
bankruptcies, any history of tax evasion, directorshi9s 
and company shareholding. Such information, if 
incorrect, incomplete or out of date can be ext rernel ~ 
damaging. It should be accessible and subject to 
correction. 
Indeed, none of the principles designed to protect the 
individual's privacy will apply to such information. The 
Ombudsmen noted the particular significance of this in 
respect of "credit reference agencies, financial 
institutions and the like. 1158 Profile building from publicly 
available information constitutes a very grave danger to 
privacy. 
Thirdly, under clause 31, a bank would be able "nei.ther to 
confirr1 nor :'leny" the existence of information, if i.t 1-s 
satisfied that, for example, its co!Tlmerci::11 position 1.vouln 
be prejudice0 by confirm.::i.tion or denial. Unlike section 10 
of the Official Inforrnation Act, however, which contains the 
SS Privacy of Information Bill 1991, clause 4. 
57 As note 55, oage ~-
5 8 ~s above, note 55, oaqe 13. 
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same provision, the clause tn the Bill is non-reviewable. It 
would therefore be within the judgement of the bank alone 
whether its commercial interests justify non-confirm,qtion. 
This may almost eliminate the 'right of access' .
59 Under the 
Code, however, the Banking Ombudsman rnay take in to account 
any considerations which she feels are relevant. A 'neither 
confirm nor deny' statement, if that is possible at all 
under the Code, would be reviewable by her . 
Finally, there are two relatively minor asoects in which the 
provisions of the Code are preferable to those in th~ Bill . 
The Bill does not apply to legal persons, but only to 
natural persons in the definition of 'individual ' in clau5e 
2. This is probably entirely aoorooriate for legislation 
with such wide coverage, for different considerations may 
need to be taken into account when dealing with data privacy 
of companies. However, the application of the Cocle c:incl the 
Banking Ombudsman scheme to individuals ann leg a 1 persons 
alike is a point in their favour. 
Also, a major disadvantage to the banks under 
legislation is that, under clause 35, they 
allowed to charge for making information 
the proposed 
would not be 
available to 
customers. However, the Code in paragraph 10.5.2 allows 
banks to recover the costs of suopl ying information. The 
Banking Ombudsman can ensure that such charges are not 
excessive. The writer suggests that it would be unreason~ble 
to exoect banks to carry all the costs of access. The banks 
already have to cover the cost of the 
inquiries from government departments 
increase in the banks' liability for 
inevitably lead 
consumer. 60 
to increased 
59 As above, note 55 , pa<Je 1d. 
bankin'] 
many thousands of 
under statute. Any 
such charges would 
charses for the 
60 The Banking Ombudsman may then be unable to review the 
charges , as these could class as a genera 1 bank 9olicy 
... ,hich does not in itself brear::h a duty owed to the 
cor10laina.nt . Terms of Reference for the l:anking 
Ombudsman , oaragraoh 20. 
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The need for le0islation 
It is suggested that it would be unfortunate if the Privacy 
of Information Bill were enacted in its present form, given 
its many failings. However, the writer contends that there 
is a great need for effective data 
New Zealand. Priority should be 
necessary amendments to the Bill. 
or i vacy legislation in 
given to making the 
Self-regulation should be encouraged under any ~ata privacy 
legislation, as it is both more cost-effective and more 
likely to achieve compliance from industry members (0ecause 
of considerations of competition) than a government-imposed 
regime .01 The Code of Banking Practice, with the few 
reservations noted above, is a good examole of effective 
self-regulation in the information orivacy field. However, 
this does not do away with the need for leqis la tion. The 
Code itself, and participation in the Banking Ombudsman 
Scheme is still essentially voluntary. It is possible for a 
ban1< to withdraw and to go its own way, as one Australian 
bank has recently done. The customer is then left without a 
remedy for breaches of privacy, unless they are covered by 
the common law duty of confidentiality. 
Also, many other data users do not subscribe to vo 1 unta ry 
codes of practice. They do not at Present have to conform to 
any standards of data privacy. For instance, if a bank is 
allowed to disclose information to a non-ban1<ing subsidiary, 
the information is then not covered by the Code and customer 
protection is lost. It must also be sair. that there are ~any 
irresponsible data users in the marketplace, an~ it is 
precisely they who are least likely to conform to voluntary 
self-regulation. Tighter, univers-'11 controls are essential 
if the oresent large number of orivacy breaches ln this 
. ~ ~ d G~ country lS to 'Je re c, uce . 
61 A useful tool in encouraging self-regulation may be the 
provisions for exemptions from the strict letter of the 
legislation, set out in the Privacy of Information Bill, 
Part VI. S9ace does not allow full consi~eration of this 
issue here, however. 
62 Consumers' Institute Consumer, January 1991, 3. 
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New Zealand must also be aware of the international pressure 
to enact data privacy legislation. As a signatory to the 
OECD Guidelines, although not legally bound, we should not 
be seen to be refusing to act. The risk of being "frozen 
out" of the international info-technology market, with the 
consequent economic impact, cannot be ignored. 
• 
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IV CONCLUSIONS 
The banking industry has shown itself to be aware of the 
growing concerns, both public and political , about potential 
invasion of data privacy . The provisions in the Code of 
Banking Practice are a useful steo in the right direction 
towards protecting customers' personal information. The 
requirements of the Code go far beyond any previous 
obligations of banks to their customers , and this is to be 
applauded . 
While it is not strictly a legally binding document , the 
banks would be well advised to treat the provisions of the 
Code as if they had legal effect. The Banking Ombuosman is 
likely to treat the Code's provisions as implied terms of 
the contract between bank and customer , and will make her 
recommendations and awards on that basis. The Code will also 
constitute the p rimary evidence of current banking practice 
which the courts employ, together with precedent, in 
deciding whether a bank is in breach of its con tract with 
the customer. 
While self-regulatory measures such as those adopte~ by the 
Bankers ' Associati on are entirely to be encouraged , r'lata 
privacy leg is la tion is stil 1 necessary. Z\s it sta n8r~.ett~, 
" Privacy of Information Bill is inadeauate to meet the needs 
of data subjects in this country . Indeed , the Code , 
especially as administered by the Banking Ornbudsman~in some 
respects ~ better able to protect bank customers from 
breaches of privacy by their ban~s. 
Necessary amendments to the Bill s hou ln be made , such as 
making breaches of the privacy principles more directly 
actionable, including publicly available information within 
the scope of the legislation , and making clause 31 
reviewable by the Privacy Commissioner . If this is cone , we 
shall be well on the way to having effective data privacy 
orotection which accorrls with our international 
undertakings , and adeauately ?rotects data subjects without 
harming the interests of commerce . 
,, 
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APPENDIX A 
PRIVACY PRINCIPLES - PRIVACY OF INFORMATION BILL 
Privacy of Information 11 
an unincorporated body (being a board, council, 
committee, subcommittee or other body)-
(i) Which is established for the purpose of assisting 
or advising, or perfonning functions connected with, 
5 any agency; and 
(ii) Which is so established in accordance with the 
provisions of any enactment or by any agency,-
shall be treated as having been done by, or disclosed 
to, the agency. 
10 Cf. Privacy Act 1988 (Aust.), s. 8 (1) 
15 
7. Act to bind the Crown-This Act binds the Crown. 
PART II 
INFORMATION PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 
8. Information privacy principles-The 
privacy principles are as follows: 
INFORMATION PRIVACY PRINCIPLES 
PRINCIPLE 1 
information 
Purpose of collection of personal information 
Personal information shall not be collected by an agency 
20 unless-
(a) The information is collected for a purpose that is a lawful 
purpose directly related to a function or activity of 
the agency; and 
(b) The collection of the information is necessary for, or 
25 directly related to, that purpose. 
PRINCIPLE 2 
Manner of collection of personal information 
( 1) Where personal information is collected by an agency, 
that information shall be collected-
30 (a) Directly from the individual concerned; and 
(b) With the knowledge or .consent of the individual 
concerned. 
(2) The collection of information other than in compliance 
with subclause (1) of this principle is not a breach of that 
35 principle if-
(a) The information is already publicly available ; or 
(b) That non-compliance is authorised by the individual 
concerned; or 
(c) Compliance with subclause (1) of this principle would 
40 prejudice the purpose of the collection; or 
• • • • 
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(d) That non-compliance would not prejudice the interests of 
the individual concerned; or 
(e) That non-compliance is required or authorised by or 
under law; or 
(D Compliance with the requirements of subclause (1) of this 5 
principle is not possible in the circumstances of the 
particular case. 
(3) Personal information shall not be collected by an 
agency-
(a) By unlawful means; or 10 
(b) By means that, in the circumstances of the case, are 
unfair . 
PRJNCIPLE 3 
Solicitation of personal information from individual concerned 
( 1) This principle applies where- 15 
(a) An agency collects personal information; and 
(b) The information is solicited by the agency from the 
individual concerned. 
(2) Where this principle applies, the agency shall take such 
steps (if any) as are, in the circumstances, reasonable to ensure 20 
that, before the information is collected or, if that is not 
practicable, as soon as practicable after the information is 
collected, the individual concerned is aware of-
(a) The purpose for which the information is being collected; 
and 25 
(b) The intended recipients of the information; and 
(c) The name and address of-
(i) The agency that is collecting the information; 
and 
(ii) The agency that will hold that information; and 30 
( d) If the collection of the information is authorised or 
required by or under law,-
(i) The fact that the collection of the information is 
so authorised or required; and 
(ii) Whether or not disclosure by that individual is 35 
voluntary or mandatory; and 
(e) The consequences (if any) for that individual if all or any 
part of the requested information is not provided; 
and 
(D The rights of access to and correction of personal 40 
information provided by these principles. 
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(3) It shall not be necessary for an agency to comply with a 
requirement of subclause (2) of this principle if to do so would 
frustrate the purpose of the collection. 
PRINCIPLE 4 
Solicitation of personal information generally 
Where-
( a) An agency collects personal information; and 
(b) The information is solicited by the agency.-
the agency shall take such steps (if any) as are, in the 
circumstances, reasonable to ensure that, having regard to the 
purpose for which the information is collected,-
(c) The information collected is relevant to that purpose and 
is up to date and complete; and 
(d) The collection of the information does not intrude to an 
unreasonable extent upon the personal affairs of the 
individual concerned. 
PRINCIPLE 5 
Storage and security of personal information 
An agency that holds personal information shall ensure-
( a) That the information is protected, by such security 
safeguards as it is reasonable in the circumstances to 
take, against-
(i) Loss; and 
(ii) Unauthorised access, use, modification, or 
disclosure; and 
(iii) Other misuse; and 
(b) That if it is necessary for the information to be given to a 
person in connection with the provision of a service to 
the agency, everything reasonably within the power 
of the agency is done to prevent unauthorised use or 
disclosure of the information. 
PRINCIPLE 6 
Information relating to personal information kept by agency 
( 1) An agency shall maintain a document setting out-
35 (a) The nature of the personal information held by the 
agency; and . 
(b) The purpose for which each type of personal information 
is held; and 
(c) The classes of individuals about whom personal 
40 information is held; and 
(d) The period for which each type of personal information is 
kept; and 
• • 
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(e) The persons who are entitled to have access to that 
personal information and the conditions under which 
they are entitled to have that access; and 
(D The steps that should be taken by individuals wishing to 
obtain access to that information; and 
(g) A description of the information matching programmes in 
which that agency is involved. 
(2) An agency shall-
( a) Make the document maintained under subclause (1) of this 
principle available, on request, for inspection by 
members of the public; and 
(b) If requested by the Commissioner, give the Corrunissioner 
a copy of the document so maintained. 
5 
10 
(3) Where there is good reason under section 26 or section 27 of 
this Act for withholding information, nothing in subclause (1) of 15 
this principle requires the inclusion of that information in the 
document maintained under that subclause. 
( 4) Nothing in subclause (1) of this principle requires an agency 
to include in the document mamtained by it under that 
subclause, in respect of any information matching programme, 
any information the disclosure of which would be likely to 
frustrate the object of the programme. 
PRINCIPLE 7 
20 
Access to personal information 
( 1) Where an agency holds personal information in such a 25 
way that it can readily be retrieved, the individual concerned 
shall be entitled-
(a) To obtain from the agency confirmation of whether or 
not the agency holds such personal information; and 
(b) To have access to that information. 30 
(2) Where, in accordance with subclause (1) (b) of this principle, 
an individual is given access to personal information, the 
individual shall be advised of that individual's rights, under 
principle 9, to request the correction of that information. 
(3) The atplication of this principle is subject to the 35 
provisions o Parts IV and V of this Act. 
PRJ NCIPLE 8 
Access to reasons for deczsions 
( 1) Where an agency (being a Department or a Minister or an 
organisation or a local authority) makes or has made, in respect 40 
of any individual, a decision or recommendation, being a 
decision or recommendation in respect of that individual in his 
or her personal capacity, that individual is entitled to and shall, 
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on request made within a reasonable time of the making of the 
decision or recommendation, be given a written statement of-
(a) The findings on material issues of fact; and 
(b) Subject to section 28 (1) (b) to (e) of this Act, a reference to 
the information on which the findings were based; 
and 
(c) The reasons for the decision or recommendation. 
(2) Nothing in this principle entitles any individual to obtain a 
written statement of advKe given to the Sovereign or the 
Sovereign's representative . 
(3) Nothing m this principle applies in respect of any decision 
or recommendation made by the Public Trustee or the Maori 
Trustee-
(a) In his or her capacity as a trustee within the meaning of 
the Trustee Act 1956; or 
(b) In any other fiduciary capacity. 
( 4) The arplication of this principle is subject to the 
provisions o Parts IV and V of this Act. 
PRINCIPLE 9 
Correction of personal information 
( 1) Where an agency holds personal information, the 
individual concerned shall be entitled-
(a) To request correction of the information; and 
(b) To request that there be attached to the information a 
statement of the correction sought but not made. 
(2) An agency that holds personal information shall, if so 
requested by the individual concerned or on its own initiative, 
take such steps (if any) to correct that information as are, in the 
circumstances, reasonable to ensure that-
(a) The information is accurate; and 
(b) Having regard to the purpose for which the information 
was collected or is to be used and to any purpose that 
is directly related to chat purpose, the information is 
rele.vant, up to date, complete, and not misleading. 
(3) Where an agency that holds personal information is not 
willing to correct that information in accordance with a request 
by the individual concerned, the agency shall, if so requested 
by the individual concerned, take such seeps (if any) as are 
reasonable in the circumstances to attach to the information 
any statement provided by that individual of the correction 
sought. 
(4) Where the agency has taken steps under subclause (2) or 
subclause (3) of this principle, the agency shall, if reasonably 
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practicable, inform each person or body or agency to whom the 
personal information has been disclosed of those steps. 
(5) Where an agency receives a request made pursuant to 
subclause (1) of this principle, the agency shall inform the 
individual concerned of the action taken as a result of the 5 
request. 
PRINCIPLE l 0 
Agency to check accuracy, etc., of personal information before use 
An agency that holds personal information shall not use that 
information without taking such steps (if any) as are, in the l 0 
circumstances, reasonable to ensure that, haVlilg regard to the 
purpose for which the information is proposed to be used, the 
mformation is accurate, up to date, complete, and not 
misleading. 
PRINCIPLE 11 
Agency not to keep personal information for longer than necessary 
An agency that holds personal information shall not keep 
that information for longer than is required for the purpose for 
which the information was obtained or for any other purpose 
15 
for which the information may lawfully be used. 20 
PRINCIPLE 12 
Personal information to be used only for relevant purposes 
An agency that holds personal information shall not use the 
information except for a purpose to which the information is 
relevant. 2 5 
PRINCIPLE 13 
Limits on use of personal information 
An agency that holds personal information that was obtained 
for a particular purpose shall not use the information for any 
other purpose unless- 30 
(a) The use of the information for that other purpose is 
authorised by the individual concerned; or 
(b) The agency believes on reasonable grounds that use of the 
information for that other purpose is necessary to 
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to 35 
the life or health of the individual concerned or 
another individual; or 
(c) The purpose for which the information is used is directly 
related to the purpose for which the information was 
obtained; or 40 
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(d) Use of the information for that other purpose is required 
or authorised by or under law; or 
(e) Use of the information for that other purpose is 
reasonably necessary for enforcement of the criminal 
law or of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty, or for 
the protection of the public revenue; or 
(~ The information-
(i) Is used in a form in which the individual 
concerned is not identified; or 
(ii) Is used for statistical or research purposes and 
will not be published in a form that could reasonably 
be expected to identify the individual concerned; or 
(g) The use of the information is for the purposes of an 
information matching programme approved by the 
Commissioner pursuant to section 92 (1) {a) of this Act. 
PRINCIPLE 14 
Limits on disclosure of personal information 
( 1) An agency that holds personal information shall not 
disclose the information to a person or body or agency unless-
( a) The disclosure is to the individual concerned; or 
(b) The disclosure is required or authorised by or under law; 
or 
(c) The purpose for which the infonnation is disclosed is 
directly related to the purpose for which the 
information was obtained; or 
(d) The disclosure is made pursuant to any provision of the 
Official Information Act 1982 or the Local 
Government Official Information and Meetings Act 
1987; or 
(e) The disclosure is authorised by the individual concerned; 
or 
(~ The agency believes on reasonable grounds that the 
disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious 
and imminent threat to the !if e or health of the 
35 individual concerned or another individual; or 
(g) The disclosure is reasonably necessary for the 
enforcement of the criminal law or of a law imposing 
a pecuniary penalty; or 
(h) The information-
40 (i) Is to be used in a form in which the individual 
concerned is not identified; or 
(ii) Is to be used for statistical or research purposes 
and will not be published in a form that could 
• 
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reasonably be expected to identify the individual 
concerned; or 
(i) The disclosure is made for the purposes of an information 
matching programme approved by the Commissioner 
pursuant to section 92 (1) (a) of this Act. 5 
(2) Nothing in subclause (1) of this principle shall be taken as 
authorising the disclosure of any personal information in any 
case where the disclosure of that personal information would 
be a breach of any obligation of secrecy or non-disclosure 
imposed by the provisions of any enactment. 10 
9. Application of information privacy principles-
( 1) Principles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 13 apply only in relation to information 
collected or obtained after the commencement of this Part of 
this Act. 
(2) Principles 5 to 7. 9 to 12, and 14 apply in relation to 
information held by an agency, whether the information was 
collected or obtained before, or is collected or obtained after, 
the commencement of this Part of this Act. 
15 
(3) Principle 8 applies only in relation to-
(a) Decisions or recommendations made on or after the 1st 20 
day of July 1983 by a Minister or a Department or an 
organisation; and 
(b) Decisions or recommendations made on or after the 1st 
day of March 1988 by a local authority. 
Cf. Privacy Act 1988 (Aust), s. 15 25 
l 0. Enforceability of principles-( 1) The entitlements 
conferred on an individual by subclause (1) ot principle 7 (in so far 
as that subclause relates to personal information held by an 
agency that is a Minister, a Department, an organisation, or a 
local authority), and by principle 8, are legal rights and are 30 
enforceable accordingly in a Court of law. 
(2) Subject to subsection (1) of this section, the information 
privacy principles do not confer on any person any legal right 
that is enforceable in a Court of law. 
PART III 
PRIVACY COM\IIISSIONER 
11. Privacy Commissioner-( l) There shall be a 
Commissioner to be called the Privacy Commissioner. 
35 
(2) The Commissioner shall be appointed by the Governor-
General on the recommendation of the responsible Minister. 40 
(3) The Commissioner shall be a corporation sole with 
perpetual succession and a seal of office, and shall have and 
• • 
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APPENDIX B 
(X)DE OF~ PRACTICE 
PROI'ECl'ION OF Cl.JS'rr:MER INFORMATION 
The f o llowing provisions relating to the protection of customer 
information have been drafted prior to the coming into effect 
of any privacy of information legislation ancl will be reviewer! 
on the enactment of any such legislation to ensure that they 
conform wit.h the provisions of that legislation . 
Banks will impose strict internal rules on the use , 
availability and access to information held on custO"ners a.nd 
f o rmer customers and adhere to all legislation relating to 
i nf ormation privacy . 
10 . 2 Banks will require all of their employees to si0n a dec:laration 
of secrecy . 
10.3 Use of Custaner Infonnation 
10 . 3 . 1 Banks will collect personal inf orrna tion for the ourDOse of 
e s tablishing and maintaining relationshi?S with custo~ers , 
including the protection oE customers ' and banks ' interests . 
Before personal information is used for plIT)'.)Oses other than 
those for which it was collecte0 , or related ourr.,oses , consent 
will be o!Jtained from the ban1< ' s customers . 
10 . 3 . 2 Banks will take all reasonable steps to ensure that informatior1 
on customers held in bank files is accurat2 , complete and uo-
t o-date . 
1 0 • 4 Areas where Disclosure of Custarer Information M:ly Occur 
10.4. 1 Banks will treat all personal information as c:onfir!entiaL 
However , there are four circUIT1.stances in corrrnon l::i.w under 1:1hich 
such information may be disclosed to third oarties . These are a 
follows : 
(i ) where the customer consents to information 
disclosure ; 
(ii) when required to disclose the information by c:ornoulsian 
of law (a list of the Statutes that r_)errnit or reguit-2 
disclosure of confidential information is attached in the 
annex to this Coce . The Statutes a llo•" t 1-ie inr:i i virJua ls 
and organisations list'?"! access to ban1<s ' confidential 
informa.tion) . t-.Jhere not r_)rohibiterl by la\·J, custCYT1"=rs rn':!y 
be notified that a disclosure or-c1:=r has l:>een receive-3 1-)y 
the bank ; 
(iii) to protect banks ' interests . For example , banks may c;:>ass 
information to Credit ·~.eference A.gencies a0out debts of 
customers who ar2 in default or ban1<s may ,'Jisclose 
infor,nation to their solicitors anc to clebt collecting 
ar_::encies when it is necessary to recover 'Tloney owed to 
them ; anc 
(iv) as an act of oublic outy . Jn excertion:'ll circumstances , 
l:>anl<s rn::i.y be unr1er a oublic duty to disclos'3 oerso'1:il 
information to arororriate authorities in matters of 
significant public interest. For instance, 1:vhere a bank 
has reasonable and probable grounds for believinq there 
is an attempt to use its facilities for criminal activity 
such as the launclering of t..r1e oroceecs of organised 
cri.rne. 
10. 4. 2 Banks will not provide bankers' references without the prior 
consent of the customer on whom the reference is to be based. 
10. 4. 3 Where clisclosure to third parties is made, the bank will, where 
ap1_)ropriate, request such 9arties to treat th-2 information as 
confidential. 
1 0 • 5 Custaner Access to 'Iheir Personal Information 
10.5.1 Banks will provide, upon customer request: 
( i) Confirmation as to whether soecif ic r::ersonal information 
about that customer is held by the bank; and 
(ii) access to r::ersonal information held about that customer 
which will include acJdress, occuJ?cltion, 11arital status, 
age, sex, accounts held, their balances and statements. 
10.5.2 The information will be provided within a reasonable tir1e. Ea!<s 
may recover the costs of supplying this informc1tion. If a 
request is denied, the customer has the right to be given 
reasons for the denial , and the right to cha Henge the .-:ienial 
through the bank's internal complaints procedures ( see Part III 
of the Code ) . 
10. 5. 3 Customers have a right to request ( or require) correction of 
personal information about the.11 in bank recorrls. Banks v,il l 
amend incorrect or incomnlete information about custorl1'2rs. 
t·Jhere incorrect or incOfY1plete personal n~corcls have been 
disclosecl to thircl oarties, banks wil 1 take all re::1son::1b le 
ste:_)s to inform those third parties of the ni:?cessa ry 
corrections. 
1 0 • 6 Direct Marketing of Services 
10.6.1 Banks will act res!X)nsibly in the use of rHrect marketing , an-l 
will also rec(XJ"ni.se the Ccx:les of Ethics of the Ne ·1 Zea l=rnrl 
Direct ~,Jarketing Association . 
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